Sudan's El-Fasher: A Turning Point Between Fragmentation and Escalation
In late October 2025, a pivotal moment unfolded in Sudan's history as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), captured the city of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. This event marked a significant shift in the country's trajectory, raising concerns about the potential for fragmentation and escalation. The fall of El-Fasher is a complex narrative, intertwined with the failures and successes of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
The SAF's earlier success in retaking Khartoum in March 2025, a strategic move to secure the political capital and boost its legitimacy, inadvertently left Darfur vulnerable. The concentration of SAF forces in eastern and central Sudan to protect Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Gedaref, a key food-producing region, created a strategic gap in Darfur. The RSF, with Hemedti's local ties, tribal support, cross-border supply lines from Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic, and revenue from the Jebel Amer gold mines, exploited this weakness. They reinforced their presence in El-Fasher, a traditional power base, and increased their drone fleet with external support, tightening the siege on the city and challenging the SAF's defenses.
The capture of El-Fasher has far-reaching implications. Hemedti's self-proclaimed 'Government of Peace and Unity' now has territorial control over a significant region, transforming it into a more credible authority. This challenges Khartoum's claim to represent the entire nation, forcing external actors to engage with Hemedti as a de facto ruler. The RSF's advance has also led to ethnic cleansing, mass executions, and forced displacement, targeting groups perceived as hostile, such as the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, while favoring pro-RSF communities. The United States has acknowledged the severity of these atrocities.
The consolidation of power in Darfur is likely to strengthen Hemedti's external support, as foreign backers view him as a more viable political actor. The region could become a hub for military aid, training camps, intelligence facilities, and drone operations, potentially easing pressure on neighboring states that previously supported the RSF under humanitarian pretexts. However, the Sudanese government faces a strategic imperative to retake El-Fasher, preventing the RSF's military gains from translating into political legitimacy. Losing Darfur weakens Khartoum's credibility and risks pushing domestic actors towards neutrality or alignment with Hemedti, further consolidating the RSF's control over the region and preparing for a potential push into Kordofan.
The RSF's next move is expected to be a major offensive in Kordofan, targeting its capital, El-Obeid. A successful advance would extend their control over a region constituting 20% of Sudan's landmass, containing vital resources like the Heglig oilfield, serving as a key food-producing area, and providing access to Port Sudan for gold exports. Kordofan also offers the RSF a land corridor to threaten the Nile valley. However, this move would require redeploying large RSF forces from Darfur, leaving El-Fasher vulnerable to counterattack and making it challenging to replicate the prolonged siege strategy. The RSF may still enjoy potential support from segments of Kordofan's population, sharing ethnic ties with the force.
Kordofan is a strategically decisive region for both sides. For the SAF, defending it is crucial to protect Khartoum and preserve the logistical backbone of the war effort. For the RSF, seizing it would solidify their territorial project and expand their political influence. Three main scenarios emerge:
The SAF retains Kordofan (most likely scenario): The RSF's lack of manpower and logistical capacity to impose a long siege on El-Obeid while safeguarding Darfur leaves them vulnerable to the SAF's airpower and long supply lines. The SAF can reinforce Kordofan with troops withdrawn from El-Fasher or other regions and enjoys multiple airfields in the area. If the SAF holds the region, Darfur may face counteroffensives to retake El-Fasher, or the frontlines may stabilize, resembling Khalifa Haftar's entrenched rule in eastern Libya.
The RSF captures Kordofan (unlikely): This scenario would require enormous sacrifices and risks leaving El-Fasher undefended. The SAF would respond with heightened escalation, as losing Kordofan would threaten Sudan's core economic and political centers.
The SAF retakes Darfur before the Kordofan battle (least likely): The SAF's logistical challenges in sustaining large operations in Darfur and its difficulties in defending El-Fasher suggest even greater challenges in mounting an offensive to retake it.
In conclusion, Kordofan remains the key to controlling Sudan. The outcome of the conflict will depend on the strategic calculations of both sides, balancing the need to consolidate current positions with the risk of major battles for strategic expansion.
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